Recently, Riolo et al. ͓Nature ͑London͒ 414, 441 ͑2001͔͒ showed by computer simulations that cooperation can arise without reciprocity when agents donate only to partners who are sufficiently similar to themselves. One striking outcome of their simulations was the observation that the number of tolerant agents that support a wide range of players was not constant in time, but showed characteristic fluctuations. The cause and robustness of these tides of tolerance remained to be explored. Here we clarify the situation by solving a minimal version of the model of Riolo et al. It allows us to identify a net surplus of random changes from intolerant to tolerant agents as a necessary mechanism that produces these oscillations of tolerance, which segregate different agents in time. This provides a new mechanism for maintaining different agents, i.e., for creating biodiversity. In our model the transition to the oscillating state is caused by a saddle node bifurcation. The frequency of the oscillations increases linearly with the transition rate from tolerant to intolerant agents.
I. INTRODUCTION
The emergence of cooperation in evolving populations with exploitative individuals is still a challenging problem in biological and social sciences. Most theories that explain cooperation are based on direct reciprocity, as the famous iterated prisoner's dilemma ͓1͔. Cooperation can also arise from indirect reciprocity when agents help others only if these are known to be sufficiently altruistic ͓2͔. In most of these models a finite population of agents is simulated, pairs of agents meet randomly as potential donator and receiver. A donation involves some cost to the donor while it provides a larger benefit to the receiver. Agents reproduce depending on their payoffs after a certain number of such meetings. Obviously, selfish individuals who do not donate would quickly spread in the population if help is not channeled towards more cooperative players. If agents do not meet repeatedly-as in a large population-direct reciprocity does not work. Indirect reciprocity can solve this problem when donations are given only to those individuals who are known as sufficiently helpful. This mechanism effectively protects a cooperative population against exploiters ͓2͔.
Riolo et al. ͓3͔ introduced a model in which cooperation is not based on reciprocity, but on similarity. In this model donations are channeled towards individuals who are sufficiently similar to the donator. To distinguish between different groups of individuals every agent i has a tag i ͓0,1͔. School ties, club memberships, tribal costumes, or religious creeds are all tags that induce cooperation. In addition, agents have a tolerance threshold T i у0, which determines the tag interval that the agent classifies as its own group. An agent i donates to another agent j if their tags are sufficiently similar, ͉ i Ϫ j ͉рT i . The cost of such a donation for i is c Ͼ0 while the benefit for j is bϾc. For simplicity, b is normalized to 1, since a multiplication of payoffs with a constant factor does not change the game. Initially, the tag and the tolerance threshold are uniformly distributed random numbers. In each generation every agent acts as a potential donor for P other agents chosen at random. Hence it is, on average, also chosen P times as a recipient. After each generation each agent i compares his payoff with the payoff of another randomly chosen agent j and adopts T j and j if j has a higher payoff. In addition, every agent is subject to mutation. With probability 0.1 an agent receives a new drawn from a uniform distribution and also with probability 0.1 a new T which is Gaussian distributed with standard deviation ϭ0.01 around the old T. If this new T becomes smaller than zero, it is set to 0. Obviously, it seems to be the best strategy for an individual to donate as little as possible, i.e., to have a very small T. However, the whole population would be better off if everybody would cooperate. This ''tragedy of the commons'' can be solved in different ways, e.g., by volunteering ͓4 -6͔.
Riolo et al. solve this problem by channeling help towards others who are sufficiently similar to the donator. Instead of a cooperative population, the formation and decay of cooperative clusters is observed for certain parameter ranges ͑high P and low c, see Fig. 1͒ . The average tolerance of a cooperative cluster grows slowly over time. Occasionally, it declines sharply. This decline occurs when the cluster is exploited by agents that are sufficiently similar to the cluster's agents to get support, but do not help themselves. However, the mechanism that generates these tides of tolerance remained unclear ͓7͔.
Here we develop a minimal model for tag-based cooperation, which displays these ''tides of tolerance'' if there is a net average drift towards more cooperation. We find that these fluctuations vanish if such a drift is not included in the model. The importance of this observation stems from the fact that if we have species that can distinguish between themselves and others and donate only to others with the same tag, then this would in the long run lead to a single group of cooperating species having a single tag. But if we introduce a small rate of biased conversions from intolerant to tolerant species, we observe a waxing and waning in time of species with different tags. In other words, the small conversion rate leads to a coexistence of different species, where *Electronic address: traulsen@theo-physik.uni-kiel.de different species appear cyclically at different times. This consitutes a new mechanism that generates biodiversity in a group of competing species. This paper is organized as follows. First, the model of Riolo et al. is simplified in order to allow an analytical treatment. Then the system without the effects of mutations is analyzed. Thereafter, we introduce a drift that increases the tolerance and leads to oscillations of tolerance. We show that the truncated mutations in the model of Riolo et al. also lead to such a drift.
II. SIMPLIFIED REPLICATOR MODEL

A. Definition of the model
Here we simplify the model of Riolo et al. ͓3͔ in order to allow for an analytical treatment. In a first step we restrict the game to only two tags, red and blue. Similarly, we allow only two tolerances. The agents can either only donate to others bearing the same tag if they have zero tolerance Tϭ0 or to every other agent (Tϭ1). This leads to four possible strategies. Then we allow partners to donate and to receive in an single interaction instead of defining different roles for donators and receivers. We end up with the payoff matrix
The strategies with Tϭ1 are obviously dominated by the strategies with Tϭ0, because the payoff of an intolerant player is always larger than the payoff of the corresponding tolerant player. There are pure Nash equilibria for the intolerant strategies ͑red, 0͒ and ͑blue, 0͒. In addition, there is an evolutionary unstable mixed Nash equilibrium if these two strategies are used with probability 1 2 . If the intolerant agents do not even cooperate within their own group we recover the prisoner's dilemma ͓8͔, see Appendix A.
Instead of simulating a finite group of agents, we calculate only the evolution of the probability that an agent uses a certain strategy. In the following, p 1 and p 2 are the frequencies of tolerant red and tolerant blue agents, respectively. p 3 and p 4 are the frequencies of the corresponding red and blue intolerant agents. As p 1
where ⌸ i is the payoff of the strategy with frequency p i . Using Eq. ͑1͒ the replicator equations can be written as blue ͑dark gray͒ corresponding to stable lines of fixed points of Eq. ͑2͒. At the top only players with red tags survive whereas at the bottom only players with blue tags can exist. The two basins of attractions of these stable attractors are separated by a planar separatrix given by Eq. ͑3͒. This separatrix is the basin of attraction for the fixed point in the Nash equilibrium indicated by a black circle (cϭ0.4 and bϭ1.0).
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where iϭ1, . . . ,4. Here ␤ determines the time scale. In the following, we set ␤ϭ1. Our main interest is the attractors of the system, and a modification of ␤ would only modify the velocities on the attractor.
B. Fixed points and separatrix
The dynamics of the system ͑2͒ can roughly be characterized as follows, see Fig. 2 . Most initial conditions lead to fixed points where only one tag survives. The frequency of intolerant players is typically higher than the frequency of tolerant players here. There is a separatrix that divides the basins of attraction of the two tags. On one side of the separatrix red players will survive and on the other side blue players. In addition, we find several fixed points on the edges described in the following.
As in any replicator system, the mixed Nash equilibrium p n ϭ(0,0, 1 2 ) is a fixed point. Here the basin of attraction is the separatrix. The separatrix shown in Fig. 2 can be calculated from the stability of this fixed point, which is discussed for a more general case in Appendix B. p n is always part of the separatrix, its normal corresponds to the eigenvector e 3 ϭ(1Ϫc,1ϩc,2) of the corresponding Jacobi matrix J n with the eigenvalue 3 ϭ(3Ϫc)/2Ͼ1. We find the equation
for points on the separatrix. As we have ͓p
, the system never leaves this plane again.
In addition, there are two fixed lines if only one tag is present: p red ϭ(1Ϫx,0,x) and p blue ϭ(0,1Ϫx,0), where 0 рxр1 is the fraction of intolerant players. The stability of the fixed points on these lines depends on x. For 1ϪxϾc, the points are unstable and intolerant players with the opposite tag can invade ͑see Appendix B͒. Finally, there is an unstable fixed line for a completely tolerant population p Tϩ ϭ(1Ϫy,y,0), where 0рyр1. The stability of this fixed line is discussed in Appendix B.
So far, the system does not show any oscillation. It simply relaxes to one of the fixed points described above. In the following section a mechanism that generates oscillations will be discussed.
III. INTRODUCTION OF A BIASED DRIFT
In order to generate oscillations in the system we have to destabilize the attracting fixed points and force the system through the separatrix. This can be realized by introducing first ad hoc a drift that increases the fraction of tolerant agents at the cost of the intolerant fraction of the same tag. If we introduce such biased conversions into our model, Eq. ͑2͒ becomes
The solution of these equations shown in Figs. 4 and 5 display oscillations in tolerance. These oscillations can be considered as the deterministic equivalent to the tides of tolerance in Ref.
͓3͔.
In the model of Riolo et al. ͓3͔ such a drift is generated by truncated mutations. The average tolerance is usually of the order of . Therefore the truncation of negative tolerances decreases the probability for mutations that lower the tolerance, and leads to a drift towards higher tolerances. We repeated the simulations of Riolo et al. and found that 50.0% of the tolerance mutations increase T while only 39.8% decrease T. The average mutation increases T by 1.3ϫ10 Ϫ4 (cϭ0.1, Pϭ3, average over 10 000 realizations with 30 000 generations each͒. If we omit the tolerance mutations in the model of Riolo et al., one ͑low͒ tolerance is quickly inherited by the whole population, see Fig. 3 . The majority of players belongs to a dominant cluster. The mean tag of this clusterand hence the donation rate-drifts slowly due to mutations of the tags. Without mutations of the tags one tag is inherited by the whole population after a short initial period. Consequently, the donation rate becomes 100%, and tolerance mutations do no longer influence the system.
A. Qualitative behavior
The attractor of the system ͑4͒ is shown in Fig. 4 , and the time evolution of the strategies can be seen in Fig. 5 . If initially all strategies are present, the system shows periodic oscillations for small and cϭ0.1. One tag becomes dominant. The fraction of tolerant players increases due to the biased conversions imposed by Ͼ0 and intolerant players with the opposite tag can invade and destroy the cluster, giving rise to a new dominant cluster with the opposite tag. This attractor shown in Fig. 4 has essentially the whole sim- plex as a basin of attraction. Only for very small or very high values of c other fixed points become stable. The system can be analyzed in two parts for Ӷ1. Near the edges p red and p blue , the replicator dynamics becomes irrelevant and the system is mainly driven by biased conversions. Further away from these edges the system is driven by the replicator dynamics. Here the dynamics is not altered by the biased conversions.
Our biased conversions lead the system from an edge that is dominated by one color to an edge that is dominated by the other color. For small c the trajectory leaves these edges near the corners of the pure tolerant strategies, cf. Fig. 4 . However, these corners are never crossed as they are fixed points.
B. Fixed points
Let us now analyze the system ͑4͒ in more detail. The fixed line p Tϩ ϭ(1Ϫy,y,0) of Eq. ͑2͒ is still a fixed line of Eq. ͑4͒. For cϽ2 , a fraction of the fixed line remains stable, see Appendix B for details. However, as we are interested in Ӷ1 the fixed line is usually unstable. Due to the flow from intolerant to tolerant players, the edges p red and p blue are no longer fixed. The fixed point p n ϭ(0,0, 1 2 ) in the mixed Nash equilibrium moves away from the edge for Ͼ0 and is now given by p d ϭ(/c,/c, 1 2 Ϫ/c). The stability of this fixed point is discussed in Appendix B.
In addition, we find two more fixed points p sϩ and p sϪ . For ϭ0 they correspond to the points where the population with only one tag loses stability. These fixed points can be calculated analytically, see Appendix C for details. The expansion for Ӷ1 of p sϩ is
͑5͒
Due to the symmetry in the tags p sϪ can easily be calculated by exchanging p 1 with p 2 and p 3 with p 4 ϭ1Ϫp 1 Ϫp 2 Ϫ p 3 . As described above, we find p sϩ ϭ(1Ϫc,0,c) for ϭ0. Fig. 4. 
C. Bifurcation at Ä0
The transition from the system without biased conversions ͑i.e., ϭ0͒ to the system with biased conversions can be analyzed in detail by considering the Poincaré map shown in Fig. 6 .
At Ͼ0 the fixed lines where only one tag is present vanish. This is caused by a saddle node bifurcation ͓10͔. A fixed line disappears at this bifurcation, and a small channel is opened through which the system moves slowly to the other side of the separatrix. The width of this channel is controlled by . For small a linear dependence between and the oscillation frequency of the attractor is observed as shown in Fig. 7 . Such a linear dependence is expected in a saddle node bifurcation with linear perturbation terms p 3 and p 4 ͓11͔. 
FIG. 5.
The waxing and waning of the four different groups of agents ͑red agents: black, blue agents: gray, full lines: Tϭ1, and dashed lines: Tϭ0) are caused by the following mechanism. A cluster of tolerant red agents is invaded by intolerant blue agents who convert via directed mutations to their tolerant counterpart, giving rise to a blue cluster which is then invaded by red intolerant agents. Although initially the number of red and blue tolerant agents differed only by 1%, a tiny number (0.5%) of intolerant agents of each tag is enough to generate large clusters that are segregated in time ͑ϭ0.01, cϭ0.1, and bϭ1.0).
In our model two small channels are opened by Ͼ0, as the separatrix is crossed twice in one oscillation. The reinjection in our model is caused by the replicator dynamics, which drives the system to the channel of the opposite tag. The dependence of the oscillation frequency on the parameter for cϭ0.1 is shown in Fig. 7 . For values of Ͼ0.02, the dynamics changes. Here the fixed points p Tϩ that become stable for ϭc/2 begin to influence the dynamical system.
D. Influence of the cost of cooperation c
Here we analyze the influence of the cost of cooperation ͑c͒ on our system by defining different measures of order in our model and by observing the influence of c on these measures. The donation rate is the probability that one player donates to another, dϭ͗1Ϫ p 3 (p 2 ϩ p 4 )Ϫp 4 (p 1 ϩp 3 )͘. The fraction of tolerant individuals can be measured as p tol ϭ͗p 1 ϩ p 2 ͘, and the asymmetry between the tags as a ϭ͉͗p 1 ϩ p 3 ͘Ϫ͗p 2 ϩ p 4 ͉͘. Here ͗•͘ denotes a time average. In addition, an average over different initial conditions is necessary. Figure 8 shows that these measures display changes at c Ϸ0. 02, cϷ0.66, cϷ0.73, and cϷ0.96 . We now discuss the reasons for these transitions. For cϽ the points p Tϩ ϭ(1 Ϫy,y,0) are stable fixed points. In the case of ϽcϽ2 only a part of this fixed line is stable, see Appendix B for details. For cϾ2 these fixed points become unstable, this leads to a decrease of the asymmetry between tags at c ϭ2
For cooperation costs cϾ2, the typical qualitative behavior is described above. The attractor of such a system can be seen in Fig. 4 . For higher costs c, the intolerant players can invade earlier as their advantage is larger. In the following we restrict ourselves to the case of ϭ0.01. The quali- FIG. 6 . The Poincaré map of the p 1 shows the ''channel'' through which the trajectory crosses the separatrix. The black lines are the function and the bisector. The distance between the function and the bisector has been magnified by a factor of 10. Therefore the course of iteration is drawn only schematically. A marks the point where the separatrix is crossed due to biased conversions from p 3 to p 1 . Here p 1 increases further, as the fraction p 4 that exploits p 1 is still very small. For ϭ0 the function and the bisector will match, the separatrix can no longer be crossed ͑ϭ0.01, cϭ0.1, and b ϭ1.0).
FIG. 7.
Dependence of the oscillation frequency on the mutation rate . The squares and the triangles are the numerical values for cϭ0.1 and cϭ0.2, respectively. The line is a fit of the frequencies for р0.01. For small the frequency increases as f ϭ␣ ␤ . We found ␤ϭ1.0036Ϯ0.0003 for cϭ0.1 and ␤ϭ1.0021Ϯ0.0002 for c ϭ0.2. A linear dependence is expected if the perturbation is linear in , as in our case. For high values of the fixed line p Tϩ becomes partially stable for ϭc/2 and begins to influence the system. Therefore the frequency decreases (bϭ1.0).
FIG. 8.
Influence of the cost c on the donation rate ͑squares͒, the fraction of tolerant players ͑triangles͒, and the asymmetry between the tags ͑diamonds͒. All symbols are averages over 10 000 initial conditions and 100-10 000 time steps. The number of time steps is taken as a uniformly distributed random number to exclude effects resulting from changes of the oscillation frequency. The lines are the analytical results for cϾ0.73, see Appendix C. The fraction of tolerant players decreases as the time intervals where the tag is invaded become longer. This has also an effect on the donation rate. For cϷ0.66 a large change of the symmetry parameter is observed when one symmetric attractor is replaced by two attractors which are not symmetric. The fraction of tolerant players and the donation rate decrease slightly at cϷ0.66. The donation rate and the symmetry parameter increase until the fixed points p sϮ become stable at cϷ0.73. Here these parameters decrease again. When p d finally becomes stable at cϭ(1ϩͱ1Ϫ16 ⑀)/2Ϸ0.96, the symmetry is complete again ͑ϭ0.01 and bϭ1.0).
tative behavior does not change until cϷ0.661. The attractor for cϭ0.66 can be seen in Fig. 9 .
For cϾ0.661 the biased conversion can no longer drive the system through the separatrix. Two different attractors are observed for different initial conditions. In the original model this behavior corresponds to the establishment of one cooperative cluster which becomes tolerant due to the truncated mutations. Intolerant individuals with the other tag try to invade, but the dominant cluster becomes more intolerant again and prevents an invasion. 
IV. SUMMARY AND OUTLOOK
We developed a minimal model for cooperation based on similarity. This model shows oscillations in the population of tolerant agents as two different groups dominate the population successively. The mechanism that drives these oscillations is a drift towards more tolerance. Without such a drift a cooperative cluster cannot be destabilized and will not give way to a new cooperative cluster. In other words, the temporally segregated dynamical coexistence of different tags is only possible if such a drift towards more tolerance exists. Without such a drift only one species would be selected. This is similar to the dynamical coexistence of species in the rock-paper-scissors game ͓12͔. The drift provides a new mechanism for maintaining a dynamical biodiversity in biological systems ͓13͔.
This mechanism prevents a single species from taking over the whole population as it makes the dominant cluster vulnerable. Agents can therefore exploit the cluster by accepting support without supporting the cluster. These free riders consequently destroy the cooperative cluster again. The cooperative cluster can only defend itself if the cost for cooperation is sufficiently high. In this case the free riders cannot take over the whole population.
The main results do not change if the number of tags is increased. However, the analytical treatment becomes much more complicated, as we have to deal with nϪ1 coupled nonlinear equations in the case of n tags. Yet, a population model seems to be more appropriate in the case of more tags, as our model shows a subsequent realization of all tags in the same order.
If one analyzes a system with a spatial distribution of agents instead of the well-mixed case described above, one observes strong segregation between tags. Tolerant players need to protect themselves against intolerant exploiters by building a border of intolerant agents around them. The spatially distributed system and the strategies that help to overcome the segregation will be discussed in Ref. ͓14͔.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
We thank R. Riolo, M. D. Cohen, and R. Axelrod for very helpful correspondence and comments. A.T. acknowledges support by the Studienstiftung des Deutschen Volkes ͑Ger-man National Merit Foundation͒.
APPENDIX A: PRISONERS DILEMMA
The introduction of ''never cooperate'' agents which do not donate at all ͓15͔ instead of the zero-tolerance agents eliminates the difference between tags and leads to the payoff matrix ͑Tag, T) ͑Red, ϩ1͒ ͑Blue, ϩ1͒ ͑Red, 0͒ ͑Blue, 0͒ 
